Palantir’s creative writing exercise includes serious recommendations for reforming DOD acquisition

Palantir is going all out on its treatise for defense reformation, launching a website at 18theses.com and even referring to its 18 theses as “in explicit comparison to” Martin Luther’s 95 theses, which criticized the Catholic Church’s shopping of “get out of hell free” cards and other wares. The language screams amateur writer, but the recommendations are serious. Here, we summarize each and provide our assessment.

1. 1. Monopsony harms competition — The defense industry's single-buyer system creates a stagnant market where traditional contractors face little pressure to innovate or compete. This leads to inflated costs, reduced technological advancement, and a narrowing of the industrial base. Multiple buyers or competing programs could drive efficiency and foster new solutions. The Horizon's assessment: True
2. 2. Cost-plus contracting fails — This procurement model guarantees contractors' profits regardless of performance, removing incentives for efficiency and innovation. The system encourages padding costs, extending timelines, and avoiding risks that might lead to breakthroughs. Fixed-price contracts could better align contractor interests with defense needs. The Horizon's assessment: Vastly oversimplified and faces bureaucratic inertia
3. 3. Flexible budgeting — Current defense budgeting operates on rigid multi-year cycles that can't adapt to rapidly evolving threats. This inflexibility prevents quick responses to emerging challenges and technological opportunities. A more agile financial system could better match the pace of modern warfare and innovation. The Horizon's assessment: An evergreen criticism at odds with congressional oversight and statutorily mandated governance
4. 4. People are paramount — Military leadership rotation policies disrupt program continuity and institutional knowledge. Officers typically move positions every few years, preventing the development of deep expertise and long-term program oversight. This constant turnover impedes progress and innovation in complex defense initiatives. The Horizon's assessment: Yes, but sometimes they're called to war
5. 5. Winning trumps requirements — The Pentagon's requirements-driven acquisition process often results in outdated solutions by the time of delivery. Excessive focus on specific requirements rather than desired outcomes limits innovation and adaptability. A more flexible, outcome-focused approach could better serve modern defense needs. The Horizon's assessment: Platitude
6. 6. Integrating design and delivery — The separation between those who define requirements and those who implement solutions creates inefficiencies and accountability gaps. This division often results in misaligned expectations and suboptimal outcomes. Unified responsibility could streamline development and improve results. The Horizon's assessment: Agreed, but that pesky budget cycle
7. 7. Conway's Law and structure — Defense organizational structures often create isolated silos that impede joint capabilities and innovation. These divisions can lead to duplicated efforts and missed opportunities for collaboration. Restructuring to encourage cross-service cooperation could enhance effectiveness and efficiency. The Horizon's assessment: Redundancy is sometimes required in an organization that might fight multiple inconveniently located wars
8. 8. CCMD budget empowerment — Combatant Commands lack direct control over their technological solutions and acquisitions. This disconnect between operational needs and procurement decisions leads to suboptimal capabilities. Giving CCMDs more financial authority could better align solutions with battlefield requirements. The Horizon's assessment: This is the Big Idea that sounds good on paper, but no matter who spends, the game is otherwise the same
9. 9. Economic and defense synergy — Current defense regulations often prevent the commercial exploitation of military innovations. This limitation reduces potential economic benefits and allows competitors to dominate emerging markets. Better alignment between defense and commercial interests could strengthen both sectors. The Horizon's assessment: ITAR, eg, is grounded in the Arms Export Control Act
10. 10. Primes need commercial ventures — Major defense contractors have become overly dependent on government contracts, limiting their innovation and efficiency. This dependence creates a protected market with little incentive for improvement. Encouraging commercial market participation could drive better performance and value. The Horizon's assessment: Agreed, but Cost Accounting Standards, etc., are anathema to commercial firms
11. 11. Private capital for risk — The current system of government-funded R&D reduces contractor risk and accountability. This approach can lead to inefficient spending and reduced innovation. Requiring private investment could better align incentives and improve outcomes. The Horizon's assessment: Government is supporting R&D for both government use and the public good beyond private sector spend
12. 12. Dynamic small business growth — Current small business programs often create dependency rather than fostering growth into major contractors. This limits the development of a robust industrial base. Reforming these programs could help build more capable defense contractors. The Horizon's assessment: Many small businesses have successfully graduated their size standards
13. 13. Stop competing with industry — Government-funded R&D often duplicates private sector efforts, wasting resources and time. This redundancy slows innovation and increases costs. Better leveraging commercial solutions could accelerate capability development. The Horizon's assessment: Just because a govcon solution is "noncommercial" doesn't mean there's R&D spend
14. 14. Productivity over stockpiles — Traditional focus on maintaining large weapons stockpiles may be less effective than ensuring rapid production capability. Modern conflicts require flexible and scalable manufacturing capacity. Prioritizing production capability could better serve current defense needs. The Horizon's assessment: Ukraine?
15. 15. Let architecture emerge — Predetermined technical architectures often fail to address real-world complexities and evolving needs. This rigid approach limits adaptation and innovation. Allowing more organic development could produce more effective solutions. The Horizon's assessment: One might argue that's what unofficial/unauthorized systems do, except they need to be secured and interoperable for the work
16. 16. Rule of law in contracts — Concerns about vendor lock-in often prevent adoption of commercial solutions. Clear contractual frameworks could protect government interests while enabling access to innovative commercial technologies. The Horizon's assessment: Government should consider life cycle costs when comparing solutions, but do a better job (law isn't issue)
17. 17. Access for private industry — Complex security clearance and network access requirements create significant barriers for new entrants. These obstacles limit competition and innovation in defense contracting. Streamlining these processes could expand the industrial base. The Horizon's assessment: Capitalist whining; make it work!
18. 18. Code as a weapon — Modern warfare increasingly depends on software capabilities, yet many warfighters lack coding skills. This gap limits the effective use of software-based systems. Enhanced technical training could improve battlefield effectiveness. The Horizon's assessment: Odd, as genAI comes for coding jobs, and war-fighting has many, many other skill needs